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Introduction: Law in Finance1 
 
Katharina Pistor 
 
 
Law’s relevance to finance is by now well recognized, in no small part due 
to the literature on “law and finance” (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) celebrated in this journal ten years ago under the 
heading “the new comparative economics” (Djankov et al. 2003). There will 
always be some debate as to whether a specific law or regulation distorts or 
supports markets, but few would argue today that law is irrelevant to financial 
markets or that they could operate entirely outside it.  
This special issue takes the debate about the relation between law and 
finance a step further by proposing that law is more central to contemporary 
finance than acknowledged in existing literatures: It lends authority to public and 
private financial instruments or means of pay; delegates power to different 
regulators, public or private; and vindicates financial products rooted in private 
contracts if they are generally consistent with the law. The relevance of law to 
finance has arguably increased with the shift from relational to entity and 
ultimately market-based finance: The fungibility of financial instruments in 
anonymous markets depends on credible contractual commitments that are 
enforceable in a court of law without prior investigation into the creditworthiness 
of the borrower, originator or intermediary. In short, law is not just an add-on to 
but is “in” finance.   
The papers presented in this issue are the product of a collective, multi-
year, interdisciplinary research endeavor. The project set out to critique existing 
                                                   
1 The papers included in this special issue are the product of a two-year research project, the 
Global Finance and Law Initiative, which was generously funded by the Institute for New 
Economic Thinking. They were presented at a workshop at Columbia Law School in New York in 
September 2011. We would like to thank all participants at this workshop for their input. Special 
thanks go to the members of our advisory board who have offered detailed comments on 
individual papers: Patrick Bolton, Simon Deakin, David DeRosa, Jeffrey Golden, Eric Helleiner, 
Geoffrey M. Hogdson, Karin Knorr-Cetina, Ronald Mann, Sarah Quinn, Sanjay Reddy, and Ernst-
Ludwig von Thadden. 
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theories in economics and sociology on the relation of law to finance and 
culminated in the development of a new theory, the legal theory of finance (Pistor 
2013). Each participating researcher (or team) developed a case study to assess 
the explanatory powers of existing theories, identify their shortcomings and 
suggest alternative approaches. The case studies were drawn from an array of 
financial markets: credit markets, derivatives, sovereign debt and foreign 
exchange. Implicit in this approach was the notion that not all markets are alike 
and that therefore a single case, say a securities exchange, might not be able to 
capture all relevant attributes of financial markets. Some case studies focus on 
events in the development of a given market, others on structural features; some 
devote greater attention to the institutional details, others to forces that drive 
deep structures. Yet all strive to explain observable characteristics of actual 
markets, not idealized models. Jointly, these case studies offer a vast amount of 
material and insight regarding how markets evolve and what factors contribute to 
their rise and fall.  
The legal theory of finance (LTF) presented in the first contribution of this 
issue was distilled from the case studies and discussions with participating 
researchers. It has four key components: (1) financial markets are rule-bound 
systems; (2) finance is essentially hybrid between state and markets, public and 
private; (3) law and finance stand in an ambiguous, even paradoxical relation to 
one another where law is indispensable to markets but can also hasten their 
demise; (4) law is not equally rigid but is relatively more elastic at the apex than 
on the periphery of the financial system, and where law is elastic power becomes 
salient. This introduction demonstrates aspects of the case studies presented in 
this issue that support and illuminate one or more of these features; it will skip 
over many other important insights and analyses which are best discerned by 
reading the full articles. 
In her contribution, “The Legal Construction of Foreign Exchange 
Markets” (2013), Rachel Harvey traces the evolution of governance arrangements 
for foreign exchange (FX) markets in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods System. Relying on archival research at the Federal Reserve and the Bank 
for International Settlement, she shows how private and public actors 
collaborated to create a system that is rule-bound and anchored in state law, 
while allowing key market participants to pick the rules by which they wish to be 
governed. Far from standing outside the law, FX markets are embedded in the 
legal systems of the two dominant markets, New York and London. Indeed, the 
scope of private rule making is determined by boundaries legislatures and 
regulators draw explicitly or implicitly in public regulation. The prime example of 
this “boundary drawing” function of law is the “Treasury Amendment” of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, which carved out futures 
and swaps in FX, securities and mortgages from the jurisdiction of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). It set the stage for the 
development of privately regulated derivatives markets and the collaborative 
governance of FX markets by the New York Fed and private market participants, 
who jointly formed committees and drafted model rules for FX. 
The second case study on FX developed by Perry Mehrling (“Essential 
Hybridity:  A Money View of FX” (2013) confirms the rule-bound nature of FX 
markets. He argues that contrary to conventional accounts, exchange rates do not 
reflect the value of tradable goods or financial assets in different markets; 
instead, an exchange rate is the price of “one money in terms of another money”. 
This holds in domestic and global settings. Domestically, the price at which other 
financial assets are converted into cash is the internal exchange rate. This rate 
can fluctuate and reflects the location of different private moneys in the domestic 
system at any moment in time. Internationally, “[t]he exchange rate is where one 
national financial system confronts another, but it is also where one nation state 
confronts another” (ibid at []; emphasis added). The national system – politics 
and finance – jointly lend credibility to the currency. Further, the confrontation 
between different nations in FX markets is structured by complex payment and 
settlement systems created and maintained by central banks – also a creature of 
law. They create what David DeRosa, Mehrling’s commentator, calls “sponsored 
transactional patterns” (DeRosa 2013), or in North’s terms the “rules of the 
game” for FX markets (North 1990). Central banks maintain a monopoly over 
these systems even as private dealers populate the markets they sponsor. In 
short, FX markets are best described as “essentially hybrid”. 
Sovereign debt markets are another prime example of the “essential 
hybridity” of financial markets. Debt is issued by sovereign states that have the 
power to unilaterally determine its legal structure and yet, when traded on 
international markets, is treated as just another fungible financial instrument. In 
“The Wonder Clause”, Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati show that in fact, sovereign 
debt appears as a different kind of asset in the domestic as compared to the 
international context (Gelpern and Gulati 2013). While in international markets 
it is one of many financial assets, in the domestic context the sovereign in 
sovereign debt is more apparent. Not only is the issuance of sovereign debt often 
a rather informal affair, but governments take the liberty to regulate its riskiness 
-- a practice that has made its way into international capital adequacy rules as 
well. The power sovereign states exercise over their debt is most obvious in the 
vicinity of sovereign default. Sovereigns can avoid technical default by changing 
the rules underpinning the debt issuance (after all, sovereigns have legislative 
powers); they also benefit from sovereign immunity rules when creditors seek to 
enforce claims against their overseas assets. These peculiarities of sovereign debt 
contracts notwithstanding, issuers of and investors in sovereign debt have a keen 
interest in making sovereign debt markets rule-bound. Sovereign debt contracts 
issued under foreign law contain more elaborate provisions on the parties’ rights 
and obligations. In fact, contractual provisions have acquired outsized proportion 
by seeking to govern the process of debt restructuring – which in the world of 
private contracting would be left to a third party, such as a bankruptcy court. 
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) are the “Wonder Clause” meant to accomplish 
this feat. First inserted in emerging market debt contracts in the early 2000s, 
they have re-emerged in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis of the 
2010s. They have been hailed as a market driven alternative to a full-fledged 
sovereign bankruptcy regime, yet cannot possibly offer a comprehensive solution 
for sovereign default. After all, a collective action clause is just another 
contractual provision that is hardly more credible than the sovereign’s 
commitment to pay. Indeed, as Gelpern and Gulati show, there is little empirical 
evidence that the inclusion of CACs has had much of an effect on the pricing of 
sovereign debt or that they have been invoked in actual debt restructurings. Thus, 
their attractiveness stems not so much from what they actually do, but from the 
signal they are meant to send, i.e. that an orderly procedure for the worst case 
scenario is in place. 
Derivatives markets straddle foreign exchange, sovereign debt and private 
credit markets. They pose a challenge to the legal theory of finance because two 
markets for derivatives, publicly regulated exchange traded (ET) and privately 
regulated over-the-counter (OTC) markets have coexisted for quite some time. 
Both have expanded rapidly since the mid 1980s, yet “unregulated” OTC markets 
have grown much faster than their regulated counterpart. Bruce Carruthers 
examines the puzzle of these “Diverging Derivatives” in his contribution (2013). 
Based on a detailed institutional account of the rise of OTC markets, he shows 
that they do not exist separately from but are deeply intertwined with ET 
markets: They are linked by major actors that operate in both. This also helps 
explain why exchanges that lost business to OTC were not more forceful in 
advocating their regulation: Their biggest clients were also the main issuers of 
OTC derivatives – a market dominated by just a few players. In this account ET 
and OTC markets are not distinct markets – one regulated, the other unregulated 
– that compete with each other for business, but interdependent venues. They 
offer key players the opportunity to benefit from price discovery in one and hedge 
their exposure in the other, to take advantage of rule-bound systems while 
arbitraging the effects of costly rules.  
In “Towards a Supply-side Theory of Financial Innovation”, Dan Awrey 
(2013) offers a slightly different perspective on derivatives markets but one that 
reinforces Carruther’s basic points. Like Harvey and Carruthers, he traces the rise 
of OTC markets to the Treasury Amendment of 1974, which protected certain 
futures and swaps from the CFTC’s regulatory oversight. This boundary drawing 
created the opportunity for financial innovation in markets left to regulation by 
participants. Awrey suggests that innovation took different forms and produced 
different outcomes: It is not always or necessarily associated with progress and 
thus does not enhance social welfare ipso facto. This, however, is what regulators 
on both sides of the Atlantic have assumed when exempting these markets from 
public oversight and reinforcing this exemption in different laws and regulations. 
Instead, OTC markets were regulated by private agents, foremost among them 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). ISDA developed 
model contracts for different instruments and tailored them to different legal 
systems; last but not least, it lobbied legislatures in over 50 countries to bring 
their laws into compliance with these contracts. This finding corroborates the 
claim that financial markets are rule-bound systems: Private actors are acutely 
aware of the importance of being inside rather than outside the law, which lends 
predictability and coercive enforcement to privately created financial 
instruments.  
In a system that is legally constructed, the ability to participate in the 
making of rules and the framing of markets is itself a source of economic and 
political power. It creates comparative advantages in good times as well as in 
downturns when existing rules are relaxed or suspended to protect the system 
from collapse. Close inspection of the legal construction of financial markets thus 
reveals the Janus face of law in finance: The credibility law lends to financial 
contracts is critical, but the inflexibility that goes hand in hand with credible 
commitments can hasten financial markets’ demise in times of crisis. This 
outcome can be avoided by renegotiation or refinancing financial commitments – 
effectively suspending ex ante contracts or regulation. Evidence from the 
different markets discussed so far suggests that resourceful private and public 
actors rewrite the rules of the game in times of crisis. Central Banks intervene 
directly in foreign exchange markets to protect their currencies or throw each 
other FX swap lines when private dealers withdraw their intermediation services. 
Sovereigns cajole creditors into debt renegotiation by threatening default, and 
private actors that benefit from unregulated markets when markets rise seek 
lender of last resort services from central banks to survive their own day of 
reckoning in market downturns. Lastly, key actors in markets for derivatives and 
other assets benefit from a central bank ‘put’ at times when no one else is willing 
to hold innovative instruments that have become toxic. 
This “differential relation” of market participants to law is apparent not 
only in times of crisis but also in normal times; indeed it is apparent not only in 
legislation but also in contractual design, as Akos Rona-Tas and Alya Guseva 
(2013) suggest in their analysis of emerging consumer credit markets in Eastern 
Europe (“Information and Consumer Credit in Central and Eastern Europe”). 
Consumer credit contracts tend to give the two parties to the contract different 
degrees of flexibility in adjusting their commitments in light of future events. 
Banks frequently preserve the right to adjust interest rates or condition the 
issuance of credit cards on direct access to the bank account in which employers 
deposit the borrower’s salary. These “salary projects” were a critical step in the 
rise of consumer credit card markets in post-communist countries, in contrast to 
Western markets where issuers relied to a greater extent on voluntary compliance 
or the court system to protect their legal claims. In short, both law and contracts 
exhibit different degrees of elasticity for different parties and in different 
systems. Consumers tend to command little flexibility in most jurisdictions to 
adjust contractual commitments when future events undermine their ability to 
perform relative to lenders (non-recourse mortgages in some US states being an 
exception to this rule). This is the case even though, contrary to widely held 
assumptions, default is less frequently the result of consumer fraud or conceit 
than of changes in life circumstances, such as disease or divorce. These events are 
difficult if not impossible to foresee and yet are widely disregarded in contracts. 
In fact, privacy considerations bar lenders from probing into personal issues in 
many jurisdictions – an example of how law frames private contracting. 
Law’s role in finance is ambivalent in more than one way: As stated 
previously, law is critical for lending credibility to commitments even as this 
impedes future adjustments necessary for averting a full blown crisis. Further, 
the ideal of equality of all before the law is in tension with finance’s inherent 
hierarchy – a feature reflected in several papers in this issue. Mehrling, who has 
previously written about the “inherent hierarchy” of money (Mehrling 2012), 
shows in his contribution to this project that not all currencies are equal: Some 
are minor while others are major; and some (the US dollar) are more major than 
others. Moreover, Awrey shows that not all innovative financial instruments find 
buyers in times of liquidity shortage. Finally, Rona-Tas and Guseva allude to the 
hierarchical relation and the inverse relation of law’s rigidity in relation to it not 
only of consumers and lenders in a given market, but also of consumers in 
different markets relative to one another: Some benefit from non-recourse loans 
while others don’t; some carry currency risk while others always borrow in their 
domestic currency. 
What then explains the hierarchy of finance is the critical question Anush 
Kapadia addresses in his essay, “Europe and the Logic of Hierarchy” (2013). He 
uses the sovereign debt crisis in Europe to examine the economic and political 
conditions for maintaining integrated financial markets and a common currency. 
Scalability is his answer. Those with bigger balance sheets can afford to lend 
support to those with smaller ones. But size is not just given or a function of 
available resources but also of the legal and political ability to pool dispersed 
resources. When central banks bail out the financial system they mutualize or 
socialize private debt in direct contradiction to the legal and contractual 
underpinnings of the financial system they wish to rescue. This is a political act of 
redistribution. Whether it will succeed in stabilizing the financial system depends 
on the credibility of decision makers to pool future resources to make good on the 
socialized, now public debt. That is not only a question of economic capacity but 
also of political coordination. States that have relinquished their currency face 
greater challenges on both fronts, as the European sovereign debt crisis 
demonstrates, because they cannot use monetary policies to accomplish this task. 
They must generate sufficient income by increasing taxation or cutting spending, 
i.e. by imposing austerity measures -- and trying too hard can cost them their 
political mandate. This leads Kapadia to argue that in light of the rise of 
integrated financial markets, Max Weber’s well-known definition of a state as a 
community that claims monopoly over the means of coercion should be restated 
as a “human community that successfully claims the apex of a hierarchical 
credit system because it is legitimate within a given territory” (ibid at [], 
emphasis in original).  Applying this definition to the Eurozone, it is evident that 
it lacks statehood at the moment, because the legitimacy to pool resources to 
protect the common currency remains deeply contested. From Kapadia’s vantage 
point, resolving this problem does not necessarily require full political 
integration. What is required, however, are legitimate institutional arrangements 
for pooling resources in times of distress. Whether such an arrangement can be 
found or will be sustainable is critical well beyond the survival of the Euro; it will 
determine the fate of globally integrated financial markets. 
In short, LTF offers a new conceptual framework for analyzing domestic 
and global financial markets. Just as the comparison between capitalism and 
socialism appeared out of date to proponents of “law and finance” ten years ago, 
the global crisis has rendered the comparison of state vs. market-friendly law 
equally stale. When financial assets that are created under the most market-
friendly conditions find themselves on the balance sheet of central banks, it is 
apparent that the key question is not either state or market, but what states and 
what markets. LTF suggests that neither question can be answered without 
recognizing the central role of law. 
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